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JUROR PRIVILEGE: THE ANSWER 

TO THE IMPEACHMENT PUZZLE? 

I. INTRODUCTION 
The right to a jury trial, as embodied in the sixth and seventh 
amendments to the United States Constitution,l is an essential part 
of the contract made between citizen and government. One 
staunch supporter called this right "the glory of English law ... [,] 
the most transcendant privilege which any subject can enjoy or 
wish for, that he not be affected either in his property, his liberty, 
or his person, but by unanimous consent of twelve of his neighbors 
and equals."2 The jury trial has been praised not only as a means 
necessary for the administration of justice,3 but· also as an avenue 
for the expression of public law. 4 Despite such praise, the jury trial 
recently has come under increasing attack. Critics of the process 
have found juries ill suited to handle the enormous volume of civil 
litigation5 and much less competent than judges are at factfinding. 6 
In the face of growing criticism, "a deep commitment to the use of 
laymen in the administration of justice"7 has survived at least in 
form if not always in substance. 8 
If the jury process is to survive, its integrity must be pro­
tected. While several procedures have been employed to assure 
that the jury reaches a proper result, 9 little has been done to as­
1. See u.s. CONST. amends. VI & VII. 
2. 3 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 378. 
3. Railroad Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall) 657, 664 (1875). 
4. A. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280-87 (Phillips Bradley ed. 
1945). Some commentators believe that the doctrine of comparative negligence was 
created by juries. Rather than hal' a contributorily negligent plaintiff recovery, juries 
would consciously decrease the damages awarded. See Fleming, FalVlIr£i: CamplI/'({­
tive Neglige/Ice lit LlIst--BIj judicilll Choice, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 2:39 (1976). 
5. See Peck, Do juries Delli!! justicei', 18 F.R.D. 455 (1956). 
6. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 180-91 (19.30). 
7. H. KALvEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JUHY :3 (1966). 
8. The llse of judgments notwithstanding the verdict, FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b), is 
one example of-the preservation of the jury trial without regard to the verdict. Fur­
ther examples are illustrated by a liberal view toward judicial summary and com­
ments on the evidence. 
9. FED. R. CIV. P. 49 provides for special verdicts and general verdicts 
accompanied hy answers to interrogatories. The use of the rule may he illustrated 
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sure that the result is achieved through a logical process. Devices 
used after a verdict has been rendered serve to check the jurors as 
factfinders. 10 For example, both special verdicts and general ver­
dicts accompanied with interrogatories are methods by which juries 
particularize certain precise details of their factfinding. ll By con­
trast, any attempt to monitor the process used by the jury to reach 
a verdict is suspect because it challenges the presumption that the 
discourse of twelve jurors will render a more just result than the 
thought process of a single judge. 12 
Tnlditionally, an attack on the verdict based on juror miscon­
duct was combatted by the privileged communications rule. 13 Gen­
erally, the privileged communications rule protects the votes and· 
verdict deliberations of the jurors by affording them a privilege not 
to disclose that information. Thus, juror affidavits or testimony are 
inadmissible to impeach the verdict. 14 This rule has been under­
going sustained and vigorous modification. 15 Thus, when a litigant 
attacks the verdict because the jurors improperly reached the ver­
dict either by casting lots or by accepting bribes,16 the juror privi­
lege analysis has been excluded as a method for determining the 
admissibility of a juror's testimony or affidavit. 
Although no court or scholar has advocated the outright aban­
this way: the court may ask the jury if they found the plaintiff contributorily negli­
gent. In a state barring comparative negligence, the judge can assure a proper result 
at law by receiving an honest answer to this question. See text accompanying note 4 
supra. Another device used by the court is a poll of the jury to ensure that a unani­
mous verdict has been reached when such a verdict is required by law. 
10. See note 9 supra and accompanying text. 
11. FED. R. CIV. P. 49. 
12. Railroad Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall) 657, 664 (1875): 
[tlwelve men of the average of the community, comprising men of educa­
tion and men of little education, men of learning and men whose learning 
consists only in what they have themselves seen and heard, the merchant, 
the mechanic, the farmer, the laborer; these sit together, consult, apply their 
separate experience of the affairs of life to the facts proven, and draw a 
unanimous conclusion. This average judgment thus given it is the great ef­
fort of the law to obtain. It is assumed that twelve men know more of the 
common affairs of life than does one man, that they can draw wiser and safer 
conclusions from admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge. 
Id. 
13. See T.W. HUGHES, AN ILLUSTRATED TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVI­
DENCE 301-02 (3d ed. 1907). 
14. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 12 (1933). 
15. See notes 139-144 illfra and accompanying text. 
16. These are only two types of juror misconduct. Others include juror misuse 
of evidence, misunderstanding the judge's instructions, and basing the verdict on 
ethnic prejudice. See notes 149-53 illfra and accompanying text. 
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donment of the privileged communications rule,17 the case most of­
ten cited to support modification of the rule is Clark v. United 
States .18 Though Clark easily might have avoided an explanation of 
this juror privilege,19 Justice Cardozo, writing for the Supreme 
Court, "[was] moved by the desire to build securely for the fu­
ture. "20 By analogy to the attorney-client privilege, his opinion at­
tempted to identify those circumstances in which the juror privi­
lege applies. 21 This view, however, aimed at preventing judicial 
shortsightedness, has left courts and commentators with a plethora 
of ambiguous exceptions. 
The availability of other exclusionary doctrines has contributed 
to the demise of the juror privilege. 22 The cases since Clark gener­
ally are satisfied to cite Clark as an explanation of the policy rea­
sons for excluding juror testimony rather than as an exposition of a 
principle available for application to a given case. 23 Certainly, Con­
gress was moved to abandon the privilege notion at least partly by 
the lack of a supporting body of American law. 24 In the absence of 
any apparent legal support, the courts have relied on the imaginary 
threshold to the jury room25 and the vague notion of a juror's 
"mental processes"26 to determine when to admit and when to ex­
clude juror evidence to impeach the verdict. These bases are used 
17. But see United States ex. rei Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971). The court stated, "although what Wigmore 
calls Mr. Justice Cordozo's 'eloquent exposition of the policy' of the supposed privi­
lege in that case seems in fact to leave little but the name." Id. at 820 n.7. 
18. 289 U.S. 1(1933). 
19. The juror in Clark was not being questioned regarding the verdict. The is­
sue in Clark centered on a bribe taken by the juror before she became a juror. Thus, 
as to the central issue, no privilege could fairly be invoked. [d. at 17-18. 
20. [d. at 19. 
21. [d. at 15. 
22. There are three other exclusionary doctrines. The parol evidence rule limits 
any inquiry about the verdict to the'verdict itself, as the final written embodiment of 
any previous discussions. See notes 68-72 infra and accompanying text. Lord 
Mansfield's rule provides that a juror may not allege his own turpitude. Vaise v. 
Delaval, 99 Eng. Rep. (I T.R.) 944 (K.B. 1785). For an explanation of Lord 
Mansfield's rule, see notes 32-38 infra and accompanying text. The third method 
used to exclude juror testimony is public policy, most eloquently stated by Judge 
Lamar in McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1914). For an explanation of the 
public policy exclusion, see notes 47-57 infra and accompanying text. 
23. See, e.g., Government of V.1. v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 149 n.21 (3rd Cir. 
1975); United States ex rei. Owen v. ~Mann, 435 F.2d 813, 820 n.7 (2d Cir. 1970). 
But see Pessin V. Keenehmd Ass'n, 298 F. Supp. 593, 596 (E.D. Ky. 1969). 
24. See text accompanying note 79 illfra. 
25. FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (note). 
26. FED. R. EvIO. 606(b). 
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in rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 27 They aptly 
illustrate the widespread problems of definition encountered by the 
courts when applying rule 606(b).28 The privilege doctrine, how­
ever, still has some defenders.29 Ultimately, the policies articulated 
in favor of the no-impeachment rule are those policies supporting 
the juror privilege. 
The no-impeachment rule, also known as the exclusionary 
rule, is the modern method used to admit or exclude juror evi­
dence. It is embodied in rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evi­
dence. 3o It is the thesis of this comment that the privilege doctrine 
is the best method for applying this no-impeachment concept. Al­
though commentators have recognized the privilege as an antiqua­
ted exposition of policy, they have not attached enough weight to 
the requisite components to establish the privilege. Where the 
privilege exists, the effects of juror misconduct already have been 
minimized. 31 Thus, privilege remains the sine qua non of an equi­
table result. In short, the privilege doctrine furthers the interests 
of fair trials and truth-seeking without retreating from a commit­
ment to protect the integrity of the jury system. 
Part II of this comment describes the historical foundation of 
the juror privilege. This history will define the privilege and will 
illustrate its usefulness. In part III, the privilege will be incorpo­
rated into rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, thus 
illustrating its effectiveness as the primary doctrine for applying the 
no-impeachment rule. Finally, this comment will discuss the use of 
the privilege to remedy any constitutional conflicts between the 
sixth amendment and the no-impeachment rule. 
II. HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF THE No-IMPEACHMENT RULE 
Lord Mansfield, in Vaise v. Delaval,32 articulated the principle 
that jurors may not impeach their own verdict. Lord Mansfield ex­
tended the maxim that "no person should be heard to allege his 
27. [d. 
28. See text following note 144 infra. 
29. T. W. HUGHES, supra note 13, at 301; 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2346, at 
678-79 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). 
30. See text accompanying note 108 infra. 
31. The privilege minimizes the prospective effect of juror misconduct by bal­
ancing the harm of disclosure of juror evidence against the rights of litigants; the in­
jury that would inure to the reh!tioll by the disclosure of the communications must 
be greater than thf> benefit gained for the correct disposal of litigation. 8 J. 
WIGMORE, sUp;'(I note 29, § 2346, at 688. 
32. 99 Eng. Rep. (1 T.R.) 944 (K.B. 1785). 
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own turpitude"33 to cover the case of alleged juror misconduct dur­
ing the deliberations:34 
[tJhe court cannot receive such an affidavit from any of the jury­
men themselves, in all of whom such conduct is a very high mis­
demeanor; but in every case the Court must derive their knowl­
edge from some other source such as some person having seen 
the transaction through a window or by some other means. 3S 
Before Vaise, common practice was to receive juror affidavits 
alleging misconduct. 36 The Mansfield rule, although prompted by 
policy considerations, was not described as a policy decision until 
twenty years later. 37 
Lord Mansfield's exclusionary rule was accepted widely in the 
United States. The rule protected the secrecy of juror deliberations 
and exempted jurors from liability for misconduct and improper 
grounds for decision. Both interests protected by Lord Mansfield's 
rule were regarded as "[h]ighly important to the independence and 
freedom of ... [juror] decisions."3s The Supreme Court demon­
strated an early reluctance to bar all juror testimony concerning ju­
ror misconduct. In United States v. Reid,39 the Court, while af­
firming the lower court's refusal to accept juror affidavits of juror 
misconduct,40 stated: "[i]t would perhaps hardly be safe to lay 
33. The doctrine was used chiefly by Lord Mansfield to prevent drawers of 
commercial paper from alleging usury as a defense. Walton v. Shelley, 99 Eng. Rep. 
(1 T.R. 296) 1104, 1107 (K.B. 1786). To a lesser degree, the doctrine was used to bar 
married persons from testifying to nonaccess in cases involving the legitimacy of 
children. Goodright v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. (2 Corp. 591) 1257 (K.B. 1777). 
34. In that case, Lord Mansfield refused to entertain the affidavits of two jurors, 
who alleged that the jury had tossed up to reach the verdict. 99 Eng. Rep. at 944. 
35. 	 Id. 
36. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 29, § 2353, at 697. 
37. Owen v. Warburton, 127 Eng. Rep. (1 B.P.N.R. 326) 489, 491 (C.P. 1805). In 
this 	case Lord Mansfield said: 
[t]he affidavit of a juryman cannot be received. It is singular indeed that al­
most the only evidence of which the case admits should be shut out; but, 
considering the arts which might be used if a contrary rule were to prevail, 
we think it necessary to exclude such evidence. If it were understood to be 
the law that a juryman might set aside a verdict by such evidence, it might 
sometimes happen that a juryman, being a friend to one of the parties, and 
not being able to bring over his companions to his opinion, might propose a 
decision by lot, with a view afterwards to set aside the verdict by his own 
affidavit, if the decision should be against him. 
Id. 
38. Hannum v. Belchertown, 37 Mass. (19 Pick.) 311 (1837). 
39. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1851). 
40. The Court was willing to accept a juror affidavit which alleged that a news­
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down any general rule upon this subject. Unquestionably, such ev­
idence ought always to be received with great caution. But cases 
might arise in which it would be impossible to refuse [affidavits] 
without violating the plainest principles of justice. "41 The judici­
ary has followed the sentiment expressed in Reid and has devel­
oped exceptions to Lord Mansfield's strict rule. 42 The exceptions 
permit a juror to testify to certain kinds of misconduct, notably 
matters that do, not "inhere in the verdict."43 Juror testimony, 
however, still remains the exception to the majority rule barring 
juror impeachment of the verdict. 44 
The early American repudiation of the rigid Mansfield rule 
forced the judiciary to articulate a different basis for its new rule. 
Essentially, Lord Mansfield's total bar to juror impeachment came 
to reflect a trio of considerations necessary for a just decision. 45 
Public policy, the parol evidence rule, and juror privilege combine 
to form these considerations. Modem case law in this area has 
relied largely on public policy with little or no attention to the 
other two doctrinal foundations of the rule. 46 
A. 	 Public Policy 
Originally, the public policy argument focused on protecting 
the privacy of the jury. The Supreme Court, in McDonald v. 
Pless,47 set out these policy rationales: 
[b]ut let it once be established that verdicts solemnly made and 
publicly returned into court can be attacked and set aside on the 
paper article, not entered into evidence, had been considered by the jury, but had 
not prejudiced the juror. [d. at 366. 
41. 	 [d. 
42. Ten states do not follow the Mansfield rule, but have developed variations 
of it. These include Iowa and Ohio. A growing list of states, currently 17, have 
adopted comprehensive codes of evidence based on the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
See M. BERGER & J. WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 606 (Supp. 1979). 
43. Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195, 210 (1866). See note 60 
infra. 
44. 	 See McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915). 
45. Dean Wigmore noted: 
[b]ut this rule of thumb [a juror may not impeach his own verdict] is in itself 
neither strictly correct as a statement of the acknowledged law nor at all de­
fensible upon any principle in this unqualified form. It is a mere shibboleth 
and has no intrinsic significance whatever. It has reference to a group of 
rules deducible from three general and independent principles which must 
be examined separately. 
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 29, § 2346, at 677. 
46. 	 See text accompanying note 141 infra. 
47. 	 238 U.S. 264 (1915). 
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testimony of those who took part in their publication and all ver­
dicts could be, and many would be, followed by an inquiry in 
the hope of discovering something which might invalidate the 
finding. Jurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated 
party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which 
might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict. If ev­
idence thus secured could be thus used, the result would be to 
make what was intended to be a private deliberation, the con­
stant subject of public investigation-to- the destruction of all 
frankness and freedom of discussion and conference. 48 
Both courts49 and commentators50 have recognized that perfect 
jury performance is impossible. Shielding the jury from external in­
fluences, however, remains critical in protecting the less-than­
absolute integrity of the jury system. The no-impeachment rule ac­
complishes this goal in two ways. The rule disallows constant 
public scrutiny of jury verdicts, thereby fostering free and frank 
discussion. 51 In fact, the judiciary usually chooses to protect the 
jury rather than to redress a private litigant's injury when an unfa­
vorable verdict has been rendered due to juror misconduct. 52 Sec­
48. Id. at 267-68. 
49. Judge Learned Hand, writing for the majority of the Second Circuit stated: 
it would be impracticable to impose the counsel of absolute perfection that 
no verdict shall stand, unless every juror has been entirely without bias, and 
has based his vote only upon evidence he has heard in court. It is doubtful 
whether more than one in a hundred verdicts would stand such a test; and 
although absolute justice may require as much, the impossibility of 
achieving it has induced judges to take a middle course, for they have recog­
nized that the institution could not otherwise survive.... 
Jorgensen v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2d CiL), cert. denied, 332 
U.S. 764 (1947). 
50. F. JAMES & C. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 71.9, at 310-11 (2d ed. 1977). 
If it is true-as it well may be-that few verdicts could withstand a test 
which rigorously requires every juryman to perform his function ideally, 
then the system should not be preserved by forcibly concealing that fact. 
Rather, it should be justified on other grounds which admit this truth and 
see value in popular participation in the judicial process, in the good sense 
of the overall view of the dispute formed collectively by a group of laymen, 
or even in taking into account the community's sense of justice-of what the 
law ought to be and sometimes is not. 
51. 2.38 U.S. at 267. See Rakes v. United States, 169 F.2d 7.39 (4th CiL), cert. 
denied, 335 U.S. 836 (1948). 
If jurors are conscious that they will be subjected to interrogation or search­
ing hostile inquiry as to what occured in the jury room and why, they are al­
most inescapably influenced to some extent by that anticipated annoyance. 
The courts will not permit that potential influence to invade the jury room. 
Id. at 745. 
52. 238 U.S. at 267. 
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ond, the exclusionary rule reduces the opportunities for third-party 
tampering with the jury. 53 An unsure juror cannot become the 
pawn of a defeated party seeking reversal of the verdict. 54 The rule 
minimizes the ability of a third party to corrupt the juror and 
thereby influence postverdict juror testimony. 55 
Concurrent with protection of the jury is protection of the ver­
dict. The right of litigants to finality in their litigation presupposes 
a verdict not subject to appeal or collateral attack based on allega­
tions of juror misconduct. 56 Further, "the courts ought not to be 
burdened with large numbers of applications mostly without real 
merit ... [;] verdicts ought not to be so uncertain. "57 
While the no-impeachment rule was based on the public pol­
icy rationales discussed above, the exceptions to the rule were 
grounded in other, conflicting policy rationales. The first significant 
modification of the Mansfield rule was articulated by the Supreme 
Court of Iowa in Wright v. Illinois and Mississippi Telegraph Co. 58 
The new rule would permit the court to consider juror affidavits 
53. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 142-43 (1892) (bailiff's comments to 
the jury and a newspaper article circulated among the jury in a murder trial were ad­
mitted to impeach the verdict); United States v. Eagle, 539 F.2d 1166, 1170 (8th Cir. 
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1110 (1977) (affidavit by juror that during trial he real­
ized that defendant was one of the men wanted in connection with shooting of two 
Federal Bureau of Investigation agents was incompetent to impeach the verdict); 
Government of V.1. V. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 148 (3rd Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 
U.S. 917 (1976) (conversation between juror and matron could be proved by juror as 
extraneous influence); United States V. Howard, 506 F.2d 865, 868-69 n.3 (5th Cir. 
1975) (reversing denial of new trial motion based upon affidavit by one juror that an­
other had stated that defendant had been in trouble two or three times before); 
Miller V. United States, 403 F.2d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1968) (affirming injunction against' 
ex parte interviews conducted on behalf of parties with jurors). 
54. Mueller, Juror's Impeachment of Verdicts and Indictments in Federal 
Court Under Rule 606(b), 57 NEB. L. REV. 920,924 (1978). See also United States v. 
Chereton, 309 F.2d 197 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 936 (1963) (court prop­
erly refused to examine jurors following the submission of affidavits by four jurors 
two years after the trial alleging that the defendant had been convicted on the wrong 
charges). 
55. Hyde V. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 382-84 (1912) (court refused to con­
duct juror examination regarding a compromise verdict); Mattox V. United States, 146 
U.S. 140, 148 (1892). See also note 37 supra. 
56. Note, Impeachment of Verdicts by Jurors-Rule of Evidence 606(b), 4 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 417, 442 (1978). ­
57. United States V. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928, 950 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 
U.S. 984 (1962) (proof that juror erroneously considered guilt of one codefendant was 
rejected). 
58. 20 Iowa 195 (1866). The uncontradicted affidavits of four· jurors stated that 
the jury's verdict in this tort action was a quotient verdict. 
455 1981] JUROR PRIVILEGE 
concerning matters that did not "inhere in the verdict itself,"59 
facts independent of the verdict. The juror's personal impressions 
were inadmissible while communications from third parties to ju­
rors were admissible. 60 The court rested its unprecedented deci­
sion on several grounds. Facts independent of the verdict are sus­
ceptible to corroboration by the other jurors, and thus the 
testimony of one juror cannot disturb the verdict rendered by 
twelve. Obviously, the personal impressions of a juror cannot be 
corroborated. 61 The Wright court also rejected the hypocrisy of 
Lord Mansfield's approach, which allowed the court to receive an 
eavesdropper's rather than the juror's testimony. 62 Finally, implicit 
in the court's decision was the elevation of a policy protecting indi­
vidual litigants above the policy supporting jury protection: 
[aJ juror should not be heard to contradict or impeach that 
which, in the legitimate discharge of his duty, he has solemnly 
asseverated. But when he has done an act entirely independent 
and outside of his duty and in violation of it and the law, there 
can be no sound public policy which should prevent a court from 
hearing the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible, in 
order to administer justice to the party whose rights have been 
prejudiced by such unlawful act. 63 
This liberal minority view has transformed the issue of juror im­
peachment into a battle between conflicting interests. The Iowa 
formulation64 has found some support in various arenas. 65 The 
United States Congress, however, flatly rejected the Iowa approach 
as the uniform rule when it was proposed by the House during the 
hearings on rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 66 Fur­
ther, one state, after careful consideration, rejected the Iowa rule, 
59. Id. at 210. 
60. Id. The court mentioned several instances in which the affidavits of jurors 
would involve matters that "inhere in the verdict": (1) Failure of a juror to assent to 
the verdict; (2) misunderstanding the court's instructions or the testimony or plead­
ings; (3) undue influence experienced by one juror from coercion by another; and (4) 
mistakes in a juror's calculations or judgment. 
61. Id. at 211. 
62. Id. at 211-12. 
63. Id. at 212. 
64. See text accompanying note 59 supra. 
65. The Iowa rule is followed in Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.607(2)(b) (West 
1979) and Kansas, KAN. STAT. § 60-444(a) (1976). The rule has' also been incorpo­
rated in the MODEL CODE OF EVID. R. 301 (1942) and the UNIFORM R. OF EVID. 41 
(1953). 
66. See text accompanying notes 122-126 infra. 
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believing that "any abrogation or modification of the [Mansfield] 
rule would entail far worse consequences than its enforcement. "67 
The public policy rationale is a double-edged sword; both sup­
port for private litigants and protection of the jury system, mutu­
ally exclusive goals, may be articulated in public policy terms. 
Merely balancing one against the other begs the question. Surely, 
the flexibility of such an approach is warranted, but the dubiety of 
decision, coupled with the flimsiness of legal precedent and reason­
ing, forms a weak base for a juror impeachment rule. 
B. Parol Evidence Rule 
The second principle supporting the modem exclusionary rule 
is the parol evidence doctrine: 
[t]he principle is that where the existence and tenor of the jural 
act-i. e., an utterance to which legal effects are attached-are in 
issue, the outward utterance as finally and formally made, and 
not the prior and private intention, is taken as exclusively 
constituting the act . . . and therefore where the act is required 
... to be made in writing, the writing is the act. . ..68 
Thus, the jury's final utterance in writing, the verdict, is the act. 
The jury's discussions and deliberations, much like prior contract 
negotiations, cease to have legal significance once the final agree­
ment takes written form. 69 The verdict becomes "the sole embodi­
ment of the jury's act"70 and "the best evidence of ... [its] be-
l ·Ie.f "71 
Little weight has been attached to this supporting notion for 
the exclusionary rule. The inherent weakness in the argument con­
cerns the relationship between the parties. In a contractual setting, 
the parties negotiating the agreement are the parties ultimately 
bound by the contract. In the case of a jury verdict, however, the 
party bound by the verdict is not a negotiating party but is the de­
fendant, a third party. Some courts recognize the potential for 
harm to innocent third parties and allow juror evidence to explain 
the verdict. 72 
67. Emmert v. State, 127 Ohio 235, 242, 187 N.E. 862, 868 (1933) (juror affida­
vits stating that bailiff led them to believe that judge wanted a guilty verdict and that 
they would be sequestered if they failed to reach a verdict were admissible). 
68. 8]. WIGMORE, supra note 29, § 2348, at 679. 
69. See]. CALAMARI & ]. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 40 (1970). 
70. 8]. WIGMORE, supra note 29, § 2349, at 681. 
71. Murdock v. Sumner, 39 Mass, (22 Pick.) 156, 157 (1839). 
72. In re Sugg, 194 N.C. 638, 643, 140 S.E. 604,606 (1927). 
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C. Privilege 
The privilege doctrine, as noted earlier, has received little rec­
ognition as a foundation for the modern exclusionary rule. 73 The 
doctrine suggests that the jury's deliberations are protected from 
disclosure unless the privilege is waived. 74 The courts have not 
rested their juror impeachment decisions on the privilege concept. 
Its mention in dictum, however, suggests the important tradition of 
the doctrine. 75 Four elements are required to establish the privi­
lege: 
1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they 
will not be disclosed. 
2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full 
and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties. 
3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the comnlU­
nity ought to be sedulously fostered. 
4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure 
of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby 
gained for the correct disposal at litigation. 76 
Although the public policy factors supporting the privilege 
have been given central importance in the area of juror impeach­
ment, the privilege alone has not been perceived as sufficiently 
crucial to justifY the modern exclusionary rule. 77 This lack of recog­
nition is probably due to an "inveterate but vague tradition. "78 
III. THE MODERN EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
A. Federal Judicial Response 
Like the state courts, the federal courts lacked a comprehen­
sive body of case law to support their juror impeachment decisions. 
Four Supreme Court cases decided over a period of sixty years did 
not clarify the subject. 79 
73. See notes 22-31 supra and accompanying text. 
74. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 29, § 2346, at 678-79. 
75. Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453, 460 (1871); Matter of Cochran, 237 
N.Y. 336, 340, 143 N.E. 212, 213 (1924). 
76. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 29, § 2285, at 527 (emphasis deleted). 
77. Carlson & Sumberg, Attacking Jury Verdicts: Paradigms for Rule Revision, 
1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 247,253 (1977). 
78. 289 U.S. at 13. 
79. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1914); Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 
347 (1911); Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892); United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 
361 (1865). 
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The initial Supreme Court confrontation with the issue of juror 
impeachment in United States v. Reid80 demonstrated an early re­
luctance to set down a general rule. 81 In Reid, the Court found it 
unnecessary to establish a general rule because "we are of [the] 
opinion that the facts proved by the jurors, if proved by unques­
tioned testimony, would be no ground for a new trial."82 
The Supreme Court in Mattox v. United States83 merely 
added to the confusion by promulgating standards for decision 
without regard to the scope of these standards. The case concerned 
a murder conviction which was appealed because of the bailiff's 
comments to the jury and the circulation among the jurors of a 
newspaper account of the trial. 84 The Court labeled affidavits 
disclosing these events as admissible because they concerned an 
"extraneous influence"85 and found affidavits which "inhere in the 
verdict" to be inadmissible. 86 The Court relied on two state su­
preme court decisions87 which added no new substantive dimen­
sion to the law. Mattox merely emphasized the virtue of the cor­
roboration elementB8 when juror misconduct was based on overt 
acts. 89 
The Supreme Court declined two new opportunities to com­
plete the central task of defining the standards called "extraneous 
influence" and "inhere in the verdict." In Hyde v. United States,90 
the Court affirmed the lower court's denial of a juror examination 
regarding a compromise verdict91 by relying on the "inhere in the 
verdict" standard.92 The Court was presented with a second oppor­
tunity in McDonald v. Pless, 93 a case involving a quotient ver­
80. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1851). 
81. See notes 39-41 supra and accompanying text. 
82. 53 U.S. at 366. 
83. 146 U.S. 140 (1892). 
84. Id. at 142-44. 
85. Id. at 149. 
86. Id. 
87. Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539 (1874); Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453 
(1871). 
88. 146 U.S. at 149. 
89. Id. 
90. 225 U.S. 347 (1911). 
91. A compromise verdict is: "One which is reached only by the surrender of 
conscientious convictions on one material issue by some jurors in return for a relin­
quishment of matters in their like settled opinion on another issue, and the result is 
one which does not hold the the approval of the entire panel." BLACK'S LAW Drc­
TIONARY 250 (5th ed. 1979). 
92. 225 U.S. at 383-84. 
93. 238 U.S. 264 (1915). 
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dict. 94 Again, the Court declined to draw some boundaries for its· 
new terms of art: 
without attempting to define the exceptions, or to determine 
how far such evidence might be received by the judge on his 
own motion, it is safe to say that there is nothing in the nature 
of the present case warranting a departure from what is unques­
tionably the general rule, that the losing party cannot, in order 
to secure a new trial, use the testimony of jurors to impeach 
their verdict. 95 
The Court concluded that only in the "gravest and most important 
cases"96 should the rule be violated. The Court's articulation of the 
strong public policy reasons for protecting the jury,97 coupled with 
the Court's reference to a legislative reluctance to modify or repeal 
the law,98 places Mattox in a dubious posture. Allowing jurors to 
impeach their verdict only in grave and important cases99 probably 
has much more to do with the capital nature of Mattox 100 than it 
has to do with that particular brand of juror misconduct. 101 Thus, 
any reliance on Mattox for the proposition that the Supreme Court 
approves of the standards "inhere in the verdict" or "extraneous in­
fluence" is questionable. 
The Supreme Court used a different approach to the juror im­
peachment problem in Clark v. United States .102 For the first 
time, using a helpful analogy to the attorney-client privilege,103 the 
Supreme Court articulated a juror privllege and an exception to 
that privilege: 
[fJor the origin of the privilege we are referred to ancient usage, 
and for its defense to public policy. Freedom of debate might be 
94. A quotient verdict is "one resulting from agreement whereby each juror 
writes down the amount of damages to which he thinks the party is entitled and such 
amounts are then added together and divided ,by the number of jurors," BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1130 (5th ed. 1979). 
95. 238 U.S. at 269. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 267. See text accompanying note 48 supra. 
98. 238 U.S. at 268. 
99. Id. at 269. 
100. In Mattox, the defendant was on trial for murder. 146 U.S. at 141. 
101. The jurors alleged that the bailiff had made questionable comments to the 
jury during deliberations, and also alleged that a newspaper account of the trial, not 
entered into evidence, had been circulated among them prior to their reaching a ver­
dict. Id. at 142-43. 
102. 289 U.S. 1 (1933). 
103. Id. at 15. 
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stifled and independence of thought checked if jurors were made 
to feel that their arguments and ballots were to be freely pub­
lished in the world. The force of these considerations is not to 
be gainsaid. But the recognition of a privilege does not mean it 
is without conditions or exceptions. 104 
The privilege was found not to exist in Clark because the juror was 
deceitful on voir dire, thereby violating the postulate of the privi­
lege of a "genuine relation, honestly created and honestly main­
tained. "105 This case represents the Rnal Supreme Court word on 
the issue of juror impeachment before the enactment of rule 606(b) 
and has been cited with approval since Clark in criminap06 and 
civipo7 cases alike. 
B. Federal Legislative Response 
Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975. Rule 
606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence is the federal codillcation 
of the common-law exclusionary rule: 
[u]pon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a 
juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring 
during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of 
anything upon. his or any other juror's mind or emotions 
influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indict­
ment or concerning his mental processes in connection there­
with, except that a juror may testify on the question whether ex­
traneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the 
jUry's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly 
brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may this affidavit or evi­
dence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which 
he would be precluded from testifying be received for these pur­
poses.lOS 
The confused state of juror impeachment law prior to the enact­
ment of rule 606(b) resulted ina House-Senate battle regarding 
what the rule should be. Thus, the legislative history of rule 606(b) 
104. [d. at 13. 
105. [d. at 14. 
106. Burton v. United States, 175 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1949) (case involved crimi­
nal conspiracy). 
107. Pessin v. Keeneland Ass'n, 298 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Ky. 1969); United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
108. FED. R. EVID. 606(b) [hereinafter referred to as Rule 606(b)1. Rule 606(b) 
was amended by Act of Dec. 12, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-149, § 1(10), 89 Stat. 805 
(1975), which substituted "which" for "what" in the last sentence as a technical cor­
rection. 
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is more an explanation of what the rule is not rather than what the 
rule is. 
The Advisory Committee's initial construction of rule 606(b) 
embodied a broader exclusionary principle. lo9 Although the lan-· 
guage conformed to the language of the present rule, the applica­
tion was significantly different. The advisors believed that the Iowa 
rulello represented the trend toward the exclusionary rule. III Ac­
cordingly, jurors were precluded from testifying about "the effect 
of anything upon the juror's mind or emotions"; and jurors were al­
lowed to testify about any act or statement occurring during the 
deliberations. 112 The fInal draft forwarded by the Advisory 
Committee to the Supreme Court, however, was modifIed to re­
flect the majority sentiment, which barred juror testimony about 
matters that occur during deliberation. 113 
These modifications were prompted by concern over the jury 
verdict's vulnerability to attack1l4 and fear of undue harassment of 
jurors.1l5 Essentially, conflict arose over two issues: First, inquiry 
into what happens in the jury room;1l6 and second, the Advisory 
109. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror 
may not testify concerning the effect of anything upon his or any other ju­
ror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the 
verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection 
therewith. 
FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (Prelim. Draft Mar. 31, 1969), reprinted in 46 F.R.D. 161, 
289-90 (1969). 
110. See notes 58-63 supra and accompanying text. 
111. H.R. Rep. No. 93-650, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1974), reprinted in 28 
U.S.C.A. FED. R. EVID. 247-48 (1975). 
112. Id. 
113. The majority rule in the United States was not the Iowa rule, but a nar­
rower rule which barred juror testimony about statements which occurred during de­
liberations. 
114. Letter of Aug. 12, 1971, Sen. McClellan to Judge Maris, 117 Congo Rec. 
33,642,33,645 (1971). 
115. See Letter of Aug. 9, 1971, Dep. Att'y Cen. Richard C. Kleindienst to 
Judge Maris, 117 Congo Rec. 33,648 (1971). 
116. [A]s I read the present draft of Rule 606, it would go further and per­
mit the impeachment of verdicts by inquiry. into, not the mental processes 
themselves, but what happened in terms of conduct in the jury room. 
The mischief in this Rule ought to be plain for all to see. Judges need not 
explain their verdicts beyond the judgment and the opinion. Were it possi­
ble to overturn a decision because, in fact, it was not based on precedent, 
but bias, and this was an issue that could be litigated, it would indeed be 
brought before the courts. Present law, as I read it, wisely prohibits this sort 
of inquiry before it starts with jurors as it is unthinkable with judges ... I 
do not believe it would be possible to conduct trials, particularly criminal 
prosecutions, as we know them today, if every verdict were followed by a 
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Committee's acceptance of the Iowa formuiationU7 as the majority 
rule. u8 The Committee's final draft barred juror evidence that 
concerned the effect of anything on a juror's mind or emotion, his 
mental processes, as well as testimony about any matter or state­
ment made during the jury deliberations. u9 Jurors were permitted 
to testify to jury irregularities that involved "extraneous prejudi­
cial information" and "outside influence."120 The Supreme Court 
forwarded this formulation of the rule to Congress. 
The confusion that predated the Advisory Committee's original 
formulation121 remained extant. The House believed that the origi­
nal committee draft, which embraced the Iowa rule, was the 
sounder approach.122 Both the House Judiciary Committee and its 
Special Committee on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws rec­
ommended the broader version to the House. 123 Conversely, the 
post-trial hearing into the conduct of the juror's deliberations. 
[d. at 33, 654-55. 
117. See notes 58-67 supra and accompanying text. 
118. Letter of Aug. 9, 1971, Dep. Att'y Gen. Richard G. Kleindienst to Judge 
Maris: 
[wle disagree with the comment in the Advisory Committee's Note, that there 
is a trend toward allowing jurors to testilY about everything but their own 
mental process ... Strong policy considerations continue to support the rule 
that jurors should not be permitted to testify about what occurred during the 
course of their deliberations. Recent experience has shown that the danger 
of harassment of jurors by unsuccessful litigants warrants a rule which 
imposes strict limitations on the instances in which jurors may be ques­
tioned about their verdict. 
117 Congo Rec. 33,648, 33,654-55 (1971). 
119. See Draft of FED. R. EVID. 606(b), 56 F.R.D. 183,265 (1973). 
120. [d. 
121. See notes 109-113 supra and accompanying text. 
122. See Letter from Prof. Ronald L. Carlson to Rep. William Hungate: 
[tlhe committee's 1969 preliminary draft allowed inquiry into objective juror 
misconduct ... and the quotient verdict was not insulated from attack. This 
approach was continued in the 1972 draft, the last draft circulated to the 
public before submission to the Supreme Court. Then in 1972, apparently 
just prior to submission to the Court, the committee did a turn-about and 
limited juror testimony to "outside" influences, insulating from attack jury 
misconduct which occurs inside the jury room. The committee's first notion 
was the sounder approach. 
Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of 
Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 
145, 163-64 (1974). 
123. The committees believed that the Supreme Court version of Rule 606(b) 
would bar juror testimony of a quotient verdict or testimony about a drunken juror. 
H.R. REP. No. 93-650, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (Nov. 15, 1974), reprinted in 28 
U.S.C.A. FED. R. EVID. 247-48 (1975). 
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Senate Judiciary Committee, persuaded by the public policy inter­
ests articulated in Pless, 124 preferred the Supreme Court version of 
the rule. 125 The narrow exclusionary rule endorsed by the Senate 
was the formulation chosen by the Conference Committee. 126 
The legislature attempted to accommodate the policies which 
protect the jury system and those policies designed to ensure a fair 
trial in light of serious malfunctions in the jury's deliberative pro­
cess. This balance is embodied in rule 606(b). Essentially, the rule 
is a restatement of the majority position reflected in the preceding 
case law. The rule, however, reflects a choice and a decision to 
support a narrow exclusionary rule rather than the broad Iowa 
rule. Further, the legislative history clearly buttresses public policy 
as the sole foundation for the exclusionary rule,127 Nevertheless, 
the ultimate result of the rule is a set of new labels without param­
eters or guides to application. The old labels for admissible juror 
evidence, "extraneous influence" and "overt acts," became "extra­
neous prejudicial information" and "outside influence." The former 
version of inadmissible evidence, "inhere in the verdict," was re­
cast in terms of"affecting mental processes." This lack of specific 
language was the mechanism used by the drafters to foster case-by­
case development of the law. 128 The previous one hundred year 
development of a body of case law which lacked a cogent founda­
tion had resulted in the confusion and imprecision that confronted 
Congress. Rule 606(b), while clarifying a few matters,129 had the 
same result. 
124. 238 U.S. at 267-68. See text accompanying note 22 supra. 
125. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Congo 2d Sess. 13-14 (1974): 

[als it stands then, the rule would permit the harassment of former jurors by 

losing parties as well as the possible exploitation of disgruntled or otherwise 

badly motivated ex-jurors. 

Public policy requires a finality to litigation. And common fairness re­
quires that absolute privacy be preserved for jurors to engage in the full and 
free debate necessary to the attainment of just verdicts. Jurors will not be 
able to function effectively if their deliberations are to be scrutinized in 
post-trial litigation. In the interest of protecting the jury system and the citi­
zens who make it work, rule 606(b) should not permit any inquiry into the 
internal deliberations of the jurors. 
126. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1597, 93rd Congo 2d Sess. 8 (1974), reprinted in 
28 U.S.C.A. FED. R. EVID. 248 (1975). 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. See text accompanying note 127 supra. 
---
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IV. THE PRIVILEGE ApPROACH 
A. 	 The Juror Privilege 
The arguments and votes of jurors are protected from disclo­
sure unless their privilege is waived. 130 As noted earlier, there are 
four requisite elements to establish this privilege. 131 The fourth 
prong of the privilege suggests the appropriate public policy in­
quiry: the injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure 
of the communication must be greater than the benefit thereby 
gained for the correct disposal at litigation. 132 Thus, the recogni­
tion of a juror privilege does not mean it is absol4te and without 
exceptions. 
Essentially, exceptions may be secured by three mechanisms 
within the privilege. First, 
[t]he privilege takes as its postulate a genuine relation, honestly 
created and honestly maintained. If that condition is not 
satisfied, if the relation is merely a sham and a pretense, the ju­
ror may not invoke a relation dishonestly assumed as a cover and 
cloak for the concealment of the truth. 133 
Second, and most unlikely, the community may decide that the 
privacy and secrecy of jury deltberations are unnecessary to pro­
mote a just and honest jury system. 134 Finally, the court may de­
termine through a balancing process that other policies raised by 
the particular case are more important. 13S 
Just as promulgating a privilege does not extinguish its excep­
tions, designating the privilege's exceptions does not renounce the 
privilege. The doctrine was born in 1670 in Bushnell's Case 136 
"with its historic vindication of the privilege of jurors to return a 
130. 	 289 U.S. at 12. 
131. 	 See text accompanying note 76 supra. 
132. 	 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 29, § 2346, at 678-79. 
133. 	 289 U.S. at 14. 
134. The third prong of the privilege requires that the relation must be one 
which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered. 8 J. 
WIGMORE, supra note 29, § 2285, at 527. 
135. The fourth prong of the privilege requires that the injury that would inure 
to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the 
benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal at litigation. ld. 
136. 124 Eng. Rep. (135 Vaughan) 1006 (C.P. 1670). In that case the jurors found 
a verdict of acquittal, and in doing so did not follow the judge's instructions. They 
were fined and imprisoned but were discharged on habeas corpus. ld. 
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verdict freely according to their conscience. "137 This ancient princi­
ple, transformed into statutory form, had the same effect: 
A juror shall not be questioned [for any verdict rendered by 
him], and is not subject to any action, or other liability civil or 
criminal, . . . in an action in a court of record, or not of record, 
... except by indictment, for- corrupt conduct, [in rendering 
such verdict, 1in a case prescribed by law. l3S 
The juror's privilege seldom is used to decide juror impeach­
ment problems. The juror's ability to waive his privilege and testify 
about matters that public policy rationales demand remain silent is 
one noted problem that deters judicial recognition of the privi­
lege. 139 One commentator noted another problem: "what is said 
between jurors is seldom relevant upon a new trial and what is dis­
closed in an affidavit is usually not in the nature of communication, 
but rather a statement of misconduct which is not always protected 
by the principle of privilege."14o Moreover, the Court and Con­
gress have preferred to use public policy grounds for the exclusion­
ary rule. 141 It is difficult, however, to distinguish those public pol­
icy arguments from the fourth part of the privilege, which balances 
the benefit to the litigant against the potential harm to the jury 
system. 142 Nevertheless, the juror privilege has been abandoned as 
a tool for decision in the juror impeachment area. One reason for 
this lack of recognition is an interpretation of the leading case, 
Clark,143 as limited to its facts. 144 
B. Application of the No-Impeachment Rule 
A dissection of rule 606(b) shows that the exclusionary princi­
ple protects: (1) Any matter or statement occurring during the 
course of the jury's deliberations; (2) the effect of anything upon his 
or any other juror's mind or emotions; and (3) the juror's mental 
processes. 145 As noted earlier, Congress deliberately cast the rule 
137. 289 U.S. at 16. 
138. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 14 (McKinney 1976). 
139. Carlson & Sumberg, supra note 77, at 253. 
140. Note, Impeachment ofJury Verdicts, 53 MARQ. L. REV. 258, 263 (1970). 
141. See note 127 supra and accompanying text. 
142. See note 135 supra and accompanying text. 
143. 289 U.S. at 1. 
144. United States ex rei. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813, 820 n.7 (2d Cir. 
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971). 
145. See note 30 supra. 
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in broad terms to promote case-by-case development of the law. 
The categories clearly are redundant. As a result of both this re­
dundancy and the lack of specific language in the rule, courts have 
decided the impeachment issue without assigning the fact pattern 
to one of the three categories above. The exceptions to the rule are 
equally ambiguous. Juror impeachment of the verdict is allowed on 
the issues of "extraneous prejudicial information"146 and "outside 
influence. "147 
1. Inadmissible Juror Evidence 
Rule 606(b) takes as its form the rule disallowing juror im­
peachment and two major exceptions. 148 In all the following in­
stances the juror's testimony would be excluded under both rule 
606(b) and the privilege approach: (1) When one or more jurors 
misused any portion of the evidence in the case;149 (2) when one or 
more jurors speculated on matters of common knowledge not 
raised during the trial;150 (3) when a juror exchanged his vote on 
one issue to gain another juror's support on a different issue;151 (4) 
when the jury delivered a quotient verdict, a verdict arrived at by 
adding together each juror's assessment of the damages and divid­
ing that amount by the number of jurors;152 and (5) when a juror 
speculated that the defendant would receive a suspended sentence 
or a quick parole.153 This evidence is excluded by rule 606(b) be­
cause it concerns the jury's deliberative process and the juror's 
mental process. In contrast, juror evidence in these fact patterns 
would be excluded by the privilege through balancing the possible 
harm· to the litigant against the possible harm to the jury process. 
Because perfect jury performance is an unreal expectation, any 
kind of juror misconduct must be examined in that context. Disclo­
146. FED. R. EVID. 606(b). 
147. [d. 
148. [d. 
149. United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 
U.S. 984 (1962). 
150. Gault v. Poor Sisters of St. Frances, 375 F.2d 539 (6th Cir. 1967) (fore­
man's suggestion to the jury to compare soundness of business policy of keeping 
pregnant woman on her job past her seventh month of pregnancy, with a policy al­
lowing women to work through their seventh month of pregnancy was inadmissible 
to impeach the verdict). 
151. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. at 347. 
152. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. at 264. 
153. Klimes v. United States, 263 F.2d 273 (D.C. App. 1959) (proper to deny 
new trial despite a juror affidavit alleging that another juror stated that the accused 
probably would be sentenced to probation and would not go to prison anyway). 
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sure of juror communication in any of the above situations would 
promote restricted and inhibited discussion. Ultimately, that ill 
could cause the greatest damage to the jury system. It would force 
each individual juror to think in a vacuum without the aids of con­
sensus and argument. Thus, the process easily could be abolished 
in favor of automatic nonjury trials. 
Rule 606(b) and the privilege, however, part company in sev­
eral other instances. Under rule 606(b) juror evidence that the jury 
set a time limit for its deliberation is inadmissible. 154 Clearly, this 
is a circumstance, under rule 606(b) , where such information was 
predetermined as nonprejudicial if not trivial. Thus, the method of 
analysis assumes that if the matter is unimportant no inquiry is 
necessary. This juror conduct fits into one of the exclusionary cate­
gories "[if] any matter or statement occur[s] during the ... delib­
erations. . . . "155 Under the privilege approach, however, the 
slight, adverse impact this information would have upon the poli­
cies bolstered by rule 606(b) would weigh in favor of admitting the 
juror evidence. Inquiry into this kind of conduct would help further 
the result so staunchly defended by the rulemakers, a rational and 
just jury verdict. Unfortunately, this kind of fact situation aptly 
illustrates the general approach of rule 606(b): To try to preserve 
the. remaining vestiges of a jury process without a prospective view 
toward improvement.· Under the privilege approach, information 
about setting a time limit would be admissible because the jury 
system cannot possibly be harmed if such conduct is exposed. 156 
The result under rule 606(b) and the privilege approach would 
differ when a juror misunderstands157 or ignores the judge's in­
structions158 or misunderstands the requirement of a unanimous 
verdict. 159 These fact patterns fit into the "mental processes" cate­
154. Capella v. Baumgartner, 59 F.R.D. 312 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (motions for new 
trial denied when plaintiff suggested that the jury may have agreed to reach a verdict 
by a certain time and hour). 
155. FED. R. EVID. 606(b). 
156. See note 135 supra and accompanying text. 
157. Poches v. J.J. Newberry Co., 549 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1977), (after verdict 
was returned for defendant in a product liability suit, evidence that one juror tried to 
convince the other jurors to find for the plaintiff because many things :m the market 
are substandard was inadmissible to support misunderstanding of judge's instructions 
concerning assumption of risk and product misuse). 
158. Capella v. Baumgartner, 59 F.R.D. 312 (S.D. Fla. 1973). 
159. United States v. Homer, 411 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Pa.), afI'd, 545 F.2d 864 
(3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977) (that jury did not hear instruction 
that verdict had to be unanimous was impermissible to impeach the verdict). 
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gory of rule 606(b) , 160 which excludes juror evidence on this ques­
tion. 16l Any chilling effect an inquiry into this kind of misunder­
standing would have on freedom of debate in the jury room162 
would be vastly mitigated by the openness fostered between judge 
and jury. Jurors would feel more comfortable to ask the judge for 
another explanation, thus enabling them to reach a just verdict. 
After balancing the various interests, the privilege approach would 
deem this information admissible. 
A third problem faced by rule 606(b) and by the case law de­
velopment of the exclusionary principle163 is that of categorization 
without thought to the specific set of circumstances at bar: any ju­
ror evidence of a compromise verdict is barred by the rule. 164 
Thus, testimony that a juror traded his vote on liability for lower 
damages165 and testimony that a juror agreed to anything so that 
he could leave for vacation on time166 are both excluded by the 
same rule barring juror evidence of a compromise verdict. Both 
rule 606(b) and the privilege agree on the exclusion of juror evi­
dence in the first situation. Compromise and bargaining are impor­
tant parts of the jury process, and such a line would be difficult 
and dangerous to draw. 167 On balance, jury protection is more im­
portant than diclosure. The exclusion of evidence concerning the 
second situation, however, is merely matching the result with an 
exclusionary label, "compromise verdict." This kind of labeling 
does violence to the jury system. It counteracts the instruction 
given to jurors to use a rational process and thwarts any attempt to 
criticize that kind of conduct in the future. 
A corollary to the categorization problem is the difficulty of fit­
ting a particular circumstance into one category of rule 606(b) or 
another. The most prevalent dilemma in this area surfaces when 
160. FED. R. EVID. 606(b). 
161. Often times a juror examination on this question is unnecessary due to the 
devices used in Rule 49 of the FED. R. OF CIV. P., special verdicts and general ver­
dicts accompanied by interrogatories. See note 10-11 supra and accompanying text. 
162. 289 U.S. at 13. 
163. See notes 128-29 supra and accompanying text. 
164. Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Senate Comm. on the JudiCiary, 93rd 
Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974). 
165. Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co., 72 F.R.D. 132 (D.C. Pa. 1976) (note from one 
juror stating that during the damage phase of the trial, another juror believed that the 
jury's answers to the interrogatories would negate all blame and thus, traded his vote 
on negligence for lower damages was impermissible to impeach the verdict). 
166. Poches v. J.J. Newberry Co., 549 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1977). 
167. See notes 196-98 infra and accompanying text. 
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the verdict is apparently a result of racial or ethnic prejudice. 16S It 
is difficult to label this evidence excludable under the "mental 
process" category or admissible under the "outside influence" cate­
gory. The privilege approach offers two methods of dealing with 
the prejudice situation. If the juror lied about his biases or preju­
dices on voir dire, the privilege will not protect him because the 
relation was not honest. 169 Alternatively, as a general proposition it 
may be true that judicial inquiry into juror prejudice cleanses and 
purifies the jury process. Within the context of the jury system, 
however, no juror is likely to enter the deliberative process with­
out personal biases. Thus, the balance in favor of the jury or liti­
gant can go either way. The approach of rule 606(b), to attach one 
of its dogmatic labels to this kind of juror evidence, is fruitless. 170 
The focus of the inquiry must rest on whether, in the particular 
case, the juror's prejudice offended the principles of fundamental 
fairness afforded the litigants. 
One further weakness in rule 606(b) has been identified by the 
commentators: "[T]hat a threat or act of violence was brought to 
bear [by one juror] upon ... [another juror] to reach that ver­
dict. "171 Concern has been expressed correctly that such evidence 
of a threat would be barred by rule 606(b). Under the privilege ap­
proach, such evidence would be admissible under the same 
guiding principle which admits evidence that a juror lied on voir 
dire172 01' accepted a bribe. 173 This rigorous coercion of one juror 
by another negates the basic postulate of the privilege, the creation 
of an honest relation. 174 
The preceding section considered the divergence of result and 
process between the modem federal rule and the juror privilege. 
The different outcomes are due largely to a focus on particulars 
168. Smith v. Brewer, 577 F.2d 466 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 967 (1978) 
(evidence that a juror mimicked black defense counsel and black defendant was inad­
missible to impeach the verdict); United States ex rei. Daverse v. Hohn, 198 F.2d 
934 (3rd Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 913 (1953) (denying habeas corpus relief to 
petitioner, who alleged that one juror was prejudiced against Italians); Cherensky v. 
George Washington-East Motor Lodge, 317 F. Supp. 1401 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (new trial 
denied despite fact that plaintiff was told by one juror that the verdict was based on 
anti-Semitic prejudice). 
169. 289 U.S. at 14. 
170. See text accompanying notes 163-64 supra. 
171. Carlson v. Sumberg, supra note 77, at 274. 
172. See notes 206-211 infra and accompanying text. 
173. Id. 
174. 289 U.S. at 14. 
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rather than labels and to a view toward prospective policy concerns 
rather than only present jury protection. The process of measuring 
one policy against another via a rational framework is valuable in 
mitigating the judge's uncircumscribed and discretionary power to 
overturn jury verdicts and order new trials. The problems of la­
beling and categorization and of unbridled judicial power will re­
surface in the next section. The next section, however, will focus 
on the confusion between the different constitutional mandates for 
criminal and civil trials and the different brands of juror miscon­
duct. 
2. Admissible Juror Evidence 
The two major exceptions to rule 606(b) are showing "extrane­
ous prejudicial information" and "outside influence. "175 Agreement 
on result between the rule and privilege is scant on the first excep­
tion and almost unanimous on the second. 
Essentially, the "extraneous prejudicial information" exception 
concerns extra-record or inadmissible evidence considered by the 
jury to reach its verdict. 176 As such, this evidence directly conflicts 
with a criminal defendant's sixth amendment confrontation rights. 
The sixth amendment guarantees an impartial jury and the right to 
confront witnesses. l77 The development of the law governing juror 
testimony in the criminal situation has resulted in a cogent analysis 
focusing on the particular issue in the case.178 
The Supreme Court addressed this sixth amendment issue in 
Parker v. Gladden,179 where defendant sought an appeal based on 
statements made by the bailiff to the jury.180 By condemning 
defendant, the bailiff became a witness against him. Because his 
"testimony" did not originate "from the witness stand in a public 
courtroom where there is full judicial protection of the defendant's 
[confrontation rights], "181 a constitutionally mandated trial was 
lacking. 182 Although the issue of admissibility of juror evidence was 
175. See text of Rule 606(b) in note 30 supra. 
176. FED. R. EVID. 606(b). 
177. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 12 (1970). 
178. See text accompanying note 199 infra. 
179. 385 U.S. 363 (1966). 
180. The trial court found that the bailiff's comments, in the presence of the 
jury were: "Oh that wicked fellow, he is guilty and if there is anything wrong [with 
the verdict] the Supreme Court will correct it." Id. at 363-64. 
181. Id. at 364. 
182. Id. 
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not directly addressed in Parker, 183 the bailiff's comments involved 
such a high probability that prejudice would result that the trial 
was found "inherently lacking in due process. "184 
The judiciary interpreted Parker as creating a "newly articu­
lated federal right. "185 Thus, in People v. Delucia,186 the Second 
Circuit reversed the lower court decision, which relied on the 
Mansfield rule, that a juror cannot impeach his own verdict. 187 On 
remand, the juror affidavits alleging an unauthorized juror visit to 
the scene of the crime were held admissible to impeach the verdict 
because the subject matter constituted an inherently prejudicial 
outside influence: "[when] the Supreme Court holds that a particu­
lar series of events, when proven, [violated] a defendant's constitu­
tional rights, in that determination is the right of the defendant to 
prove facts substantiating his claim. "188 The court's confrontation 
clause rationale, however, evolved into a more specific inquiry into 
"the nature of what has infiltrated to the jury and the probability of 
prejudice. "189 The ultimate result has been to protect juries and 
criminal defendants alike. 
This new approach crystallized in United States ex reI. Owen 
v. McMann. 190 Unlike DeLucia and Parker,191 this case did not in­
volve an outside force but involved comments made by one juror 
to another about defendant's past record. 192 After an evidentiary 
hearing, the district court set aside the conviction based on the 
deprivation of defendant's constitutional confrontation rights. 193 
The court of appeals affirmed the decision but not the process. 194 
Judge Friendly noted that jurors do not become unsworn witnesses 
within the scope of the confrontation clause the moment they 
183. The Court did consider the affidavit of one juror which supported the trial 
court's finding that the communication was prejudicial to the defendant. In reversing 
the Oregon Supreme Court, the juror evidence considered was a statement by the ju­
ror that she was prejudiced by the bailiff's remarks. Id. at 365 n.3. 
184. Id. at 365. 
185. United States ex reI. Owen v. McMann, 373 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1967). 
186. 15 N.Y.2d 294, 206 N.E.2d 324, 258 N.Y.S.2d 377, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 
821 (1965), on reargument, 20 N.Y.2d 275, 229 N.E.2d 211, 282 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1967). 
187. Id. at 296,206 N.E.2d at 325,258 N.Y.S.2d at 378. 
188. People v. DeLucia, 20 N.Y.2d at 279, 229 N.E.2d at 214, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 
531. 
189. United States ex rei. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813, 818 (2d Cir. 1970), 
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971). 
190. Id. 
191. See text accompanying notes 180 and 188 supra. 
192. 435 F.2d at 815. 
193. Id. at 815-16. 
194. Id. at 817-18. 
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"[pass] a fraction of an inch beyond the record of evidence...."195 
The Owen approach recognizes the impossibility that a jury could 
ever be "a laboratory, completely sterilized and free from any ex­
ternal factors"196 and that no constitutional deprivation results 
when "jurors with open minds were influenced to some degree by 
community knowledge. . . . "197 Jury consideration of this kind of 
information was part of the rationale for the constitutionally pro­
tected right to a jury trial. 19S 
This inquiry, articulated in Owen, found further support in the 
Fifth Circuit: 
[w}e cannot expunge from jury deliberations the subjective opin­
ions of jurors, their attitudinal expositions, or their philosophies. 
. . . Nevertheless, while the jury may leaven its deliberation 
with its wisdom and experience, in doing so it must not bring 
extra facts into the jury room. In every criminal case we must 
endeavor to see that jurors do not [consider} in the confines of 
the jury room . . . specific £acts about the specific defendant 
then on trial. 199 
Thus, the resolution of the juror impeachment issue in criminal sit­
uations resembles the privilege approach. Resolution is not de­
pendent on proper or improper labeling but rather on a balance 
between possible harm to the jury system and the need for particu­
lar information to fulfill constitutional mandates. The problem 
arises, however, when this balance is applied cavalierly to civil 
cases without regard to the particular issues raised. 
Reliance by the civil judiciary on the criminal juror impeach­
ment standard, coupled with a congressional attitude to shuttle 
civil cases through the courts, has resulted in disparate results in 
the area of the "extraneous prejudicial information" exception. Un­
fortunately, civil cases have applied the label "extraneous prejudi­
cial information" without considering its meaning. In civil cases the 
term includes matters specifically noted in the criminal cases as out­
side the "extraneous prejudicial information" category. Thus, evi­
dence that jurors have consulted general books about drug traffic2°o 
195. Id. at 817. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. (quoting Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 733 (1963) (Clark, J., dis­
senting)). 
198. Id. See also Broeder, the Impact of the Vicinage Requirements: An Em­
pirical Look, 45 NEB. L. REV. 99, 101 (1966). . 
199. United States v. McKinney, 429 F.2d 1019, 1022-23 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
401 U.S. 922 (1970) (emphasis deleted). 
200. Paz v. United States, 462 F.2d 740 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 820 
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and driver manuals201 has been admissible. Further, jury ver­
dicts have been overturned based on the presence of inadmissible 
evidence without an inquiry to determine prejudice. 202 Surely, if 
criminal courts faced with a constitutional mandate require evi­
dence of prejudice before overturning the verdict, civil courts are 
under no less of an obligation. 
The approach in civil cases has been to categorize such things 
as "unauthorized experiment"203 or "accidentally discovered evi­
dence"204 as "extraneous prejudicial information." The effect of this 
process is to delete the word "prejudicial" and make the exception 
include only "extraneous information." As clearly noted in Owen: 
"[t]here is no rational distinction between the potentially prejudi­
cial effect of extra-record information which a juror enunciates on 
the basis of the printed word and that which comes from his 
brain. "205 Thus, the extraneous nature of extra-record information is 
not nearly as important as its potential for prejudice. The privilege 
approach would take the juror's knowledge and apply the balancing 
process: Protection of the jury versus the litigant's right to a fair 
trial with the focus on possible prejudice rather than on the partic­
ular brand of juror misconduct. 
The second major exception to the exclusionary rule permits 
juror impeachment of verdicts when evidence of an improper out­
side influence is shown. 206 Essentially, this exception is applied in 
cases of juror bribes,207 threats to jurors,208 and juror use of nar­
coticS. 209 
(1973) (new trial granted where books on drug traffic, drug problems, and people in­
volved with drugs were found in the jury room as allowed by the judge). 
201. Stiles ·v. Lawrie, 211 F.2d 188 (6th Cir. 1954) (new trial ordered when 
driver manual was used by jury to determine speed of vehicle from length of skid 
marks). 
202. United States v. Michener, 152 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1945) (allowing all corpo­
rate records in court to be received in evidence although they contained inadmissi­
ble notations was error even though no prejudice could be determined). 
203. D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, 3 FEDERAL EVIDENCE 135 n.57 (1979) . 
. 204. [d. at 135 n.56. 
205. 435 F.2d at 820. 
206. FED. R. EVID. 606(b). 
207. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954) (new trial ordered when 
jury foreman was approached with a bribe); Jorgensen v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 
F.2d 432 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 764 (1947) (mentioned bribery as a matter 
upon which juror affidavits may be received (dictum)). 
208. Krause v. Rhodes, 570 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 924 
(1978) (new trial ordered when juror and his family had been threatened three times 
and juror had been and his family had been threatened three times and juror had 
been assaulted). 
209. Jorgensen v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
322 U.S. 764 (1947). 
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The privilege approach is in accord with these results. Any 
matter or event that may impugn the juror's honesty negates the 
privilege. 21o This rubrick also may be used effectively to uncover 
evidence of one juror coercing another211 or of an insane juror. 212 
V. CONCLUSION 
Juror impeachment notions sprouted from a serious concern 
for protecting the jury system's privacy. A jury free from scrutiny 
and criticism is the traditional model capable of rendering rational 
and just jury verdicts. When a litigant challenges the jury's verdict, 
he raises doubts about the process and the factors used by the ju­
rors to reach their verdict. Further, a litigant's challenge reminds 
the court of his rights and, by implication, the need to consider 
these rights as part of the decision to admit or exclude juror evi­
dence. 
Originally, Lord Mansfield's rule raised a total bar to juror im­
peachment of the verdict. This rule was modified by Congress to 
allow juror impeachment in certain circumstances. Congress's at­
tempt in rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence to accommo­
date the conflicting interests of jury and litigant protection has 
failed. The broad language of rule 606(b) , specifically designed to 
foster case-by-case development of juror impeachment law, para­
doxically has raised further barriers to the accommodation process. 
Cases arising since the enactment of rule 606(b) have defined 
three vague categories within the rule. The rule sets out three cat­
egories where juror evidence is excluded: (1) Any matter or state­
ment occurring during the deliberations; (2) the effect of anything 
upon a juror's mind or emotions; and (3) the juror's mental process. 
The courts, however, have been unable to discern the parameters 
of each exclusion. In addition, due to the broadness of each cate­
gory many courts have been content merely to label the particular 
juror misconduct. This same problem applies to the two exceptions 
in rule 606(b) which admit juror evidence upon a showing of: (1) 
Extraneous prejudicial information or (2) outside influence. The 
problems of vagueness in the rule and eager labeling by the courts 
have resulted in disparate decisions in particular and the lack of a 
cogent doctrine in general. 
210. 289 U.S. at 14. 
211. See text accompanying notes 171-74 supra. 
212. United States v. Dioguardi, 492 F.2d 70, 80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 
U.S. 829 (1974) ("absent substantial if not wholly conclusive evidence," courts are 
unWilling to subject jurors to a hearing on mental condition). 
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Congress promulgated rule 606(b) to resolve conflicting inter­
ests. It is improper to apply the rule without reference to the poli­
cies that originally prompted the juror impeachment rule. To fa­
cilitate the implementation of these policies, Congress and the 
courts should adopt a juror privilege approach for juror impeach­
ment problems. Recognition that a process is required to balance 
these policies is an important first step. The fourth prong of the 
privilege, which balances protection of the jury against the desire 
for a fair disposal of litigation, is the keynote of this process. 
Rather than label particular brands of juror misconduct, the 
courts should address the policies presented. The value of 
delineating one policy over another through a rational balancing 
process is substantial. The balancing approach of the' privilege 
would result in more consistent and fair decisions. The use of this 
approach would mitigate the judge's discretionary power to over­
turn verdicts. Further, the privilege approach considers prospec­
tive improvement of and potential harm to the jury system, unlike 
rule 606(b) which deals only with present concerns. The courts and 
Congress must act in a manner parallel to the reality of a 
crumbling jury system, a system without proper guidelines or en­
couragement to reach a just verdict. Merely buttressing a crum­
bled building is insufficient when a new foundation is required. 
Lisa A. Prager 
